Is Dillian Whyte suing Boxingscene?

[Citizen Koba]

This part from the English law wiki does interest me.

"English defamation law puts the burden of proving the truth of allegedly defamatory statements on the defendant, rather than the plaintiff..."

Possibly, Whytes counsel is hoping that Hauser cannot prove the authenticity of the statements.

I feel like American law should have jurisdiction, but my knowledge of international law is zero, barring a brief lecture on the complexities of international adoption.

Yeah. The burden of proof is the most glaring and obvious difference... Law ain't a field I ever paid much attention to beyond where it affected me directly and usually then it was just a case of saying 'guilty'..

Thing is reading Hausers article it's hard for me to see anything that is really controversial and since the substance of Hausers claims (ie that 'Multiple sources have confirmed that an "A" sample taken from Dillian Whyte tested positive for one or more banned substances prior to Whyte's July 20 fight in London against Oscar Rivas.') has already been accepted de facto by virtue UKAD releasing their recent statement I'm not sure what success they might have.

Reading a little bit around it, it seems that furthermore the US SPEECH act of 2010 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPEECH_Act) basically renders foreign (and most specifically UK) libel cases unenforceable in the Us, which begs the question of why Whytes legal advisors are going down this route at all - And I'm gonna assume they ain't just incompetent or somesuch.

[Ray*]

Then they’re wrong.

That’s not up to me or you.

[Larry the boss]

I hope so ,it’s a fraudulent site with defamation of characters all the time bc it’s a Wilder site ......yea and what ? What a bunch of crap daily on here and the posters are ignorant 24/7 on here like Larry and co.....if they got hit by a bus ppl would laugh on here.lolololll

More trash pouring out of this walking trash can

[PotentialToast]

Reporters aren’t bound by UKAD’s policies.

No, but they are bound by laws of confidentiality. Facts suck I know but the legal basis in the UK:

COCO V A N CLARK (ENGINEERS) LTD: CHD 1968
A claim was made for breach of confidence in respect of technical information whose value was commercial.
Held: Megarry J set out three elements which will normally be required if, apart from contract, a case of breach of confidence is to succeed. In this case the information was found not to be of a confidential nature as it was already in the public domain. Megarry went on to say: ‘where information of commercial or industrial value is given on a business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind, such as a joint venture . . I would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a contention that he was bound by an obligation of confidence.’
‘First, the information must be of a confidential nature. As Lord Greene said in the Saltman case . . ‘something which is public property and public knowledge’ cannot per se provide any foundation for proceedings for breach of confidence. However confidential the circumstances of communication, there can be no breach of confidence in revealing to others something which is already common knowledge. But this must not be taken too far. Something that has been constructed solely from materials in the public domain may possess the necessary quality of confidentiality: for something new and confidential may have been brought into being by the application of the skill and ingenuity of the human brain . . Novelty depends on the thing itself, and not upon the quality of its constituent parts . . whether it is described as originality or novelty or ingenuity or otherwise, I think there must be some product of the human brain which suffices to confer a confidential nature upon the information.
The second requirement is that the information must have been communicated in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. However secret and confidential the information, there can be no binding obligation of confidence if that information is blurted out in public or is communicated in other circumstances which negative any duty of holding it confidential. From the authorities cited to me, I have not been able to derive any very precise idea of what test is to be applied in determining whether the circumstances import an obligation of confidence. In the Argyll case . . Ungoed-Thomas, J. concluded his discussion of the circumstances in which the publication of marital communications should be restrained as being confidential by saying ‘If this was a well-developed jurisdiction doubtless there would be guides and tests to aid in exercising it’. In the absence of such guides or tests he then in effect concluded that part of the communications there in question would on any reasonable test emerge as confidential. It may be that that hard-worked creature, the reasonable man, may be pressed into service once more; for I do not see why he should not labour in equity as well as at law. It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation of confidence. In particular, where information of commercial or industrial value is given on a business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind, such as a joint venture or the manufacture of articles by one party for the other, I would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a contention that he was bound by an obligation of confidence: see the Saltman case . . On that footing, for reasons that will appear, I do not think I need explore this head further. I merely add that I doubt whether equity would intervene unless the circumstances are of sufficient gravity; equity ought not to be invoked merely to protect trivial tittle-tattle, however confidential.
Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of the person communicating it. Some of the statements of principle in the cases omit any mention of detriment; others include it. At first sight, it seems that detriment ought to be present if equity is to be induced to intervene; but I can conceive of cases where a plaintiff might have substantial motives for seeking the aid of equity and yet suffer nothing which could fairly be called detriment to him, as when the confidential information shows him in a favourable light but gravely injures some relation or friend of his whom he wishes to protect. The point does not arise for decision in this case, for detriment to the plaintiff plainly exists. I need therefore say no more than that although for the purposes of this case I have stated the proposition in the stricter form, I wish to keep open the possibility of the true proposition being that in the wider form.’
Megarry J said: ‘if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose on him the equitable obligation of confidence.’

[PotentialToast]

It's possible there's a case under UK law, but not under US law... what the benefit would be of establishing guilt in a UK court that was not enforceable over Hauser or the 'Scene ain't immediately obvious to me, but I'd like to imagine they've got some reason for it.

Any court decision in the UK for money against a US entity is immediately enforceable in the US (rubber stamp, pay the cash). Same the other way around.

[Citizen Koba]

Any court decision in the UK for money against a US entity is immediately enforceable in the US (rubber stamp, pay the cash). Same the other way around.

Umm. Not what I'm hearing. In fact the Yanks actually crafted a law specifically to prevent libel tourism or libel cases being brought against their citizens or en****** (EDIT: jesus christ, that isn't even how you spell T1TT1ES ).. under foreign - particularly Uk - law...

English defamation law puts the burden of proving the truth of allegedly defamatory statements on the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, and has been considered an impediment to free speech in much of the developed world. In many cases of libel tourism, plaintiffs sued in England to censor critical works when their home countries would reject the case outright. In the United States, the 2010 SPEECH Act makes foreign libel judgements unenforceable and unrecognizable by U.S. courts if they don't comply with U.S. protections for freedom of speech and due process, and was made largely in response to the English laws.[4]

Though it's worth noting that UK law was sunsequently (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defamation_Act_2013, enacted 01/01/14) changed to bring into more closely into line with Us and other international standards, though without changing the most significant difference which is where the burden of proof lies.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_defamation_law

Though I freely acknowledge my general ignorance of the topic so if I'm using false or outdated sources or am misunderstanding the issue in some way please point me in the direction of some more accurate information.

And for what it's worth on broader issues not necesaarily related to legal compensation they got a number of other powers over us that ain't fully reciprocated - extraditions is one biggie, though both Governments have tried to claim otherwise - and I suspect the trend will absolutely continue post Brexit, especially in trade law since we'll be negotiating from a position of even greater weakness.

[ShaneMosleySr]

That case is an engineer suing an engineer. It has nothing to do with a media report.

No, but they are bound by laws of confidentiality. Facts suck I know but the legal basis in the UK:

COCO V A N CLARK (ENGINEERS) LTD: CHD 1968
A claim was made for breach of confidence in respect of technical information whose value was commercial.
Held: Megarry J set out three elements which will normally be required if, apart from contract, a case of breach of confidence is to succeed. In this case the information was found not to be of a confidential nature as it was already in the public domain. Megarry went on to say: ‘where information of commercial or industrial value is given on a business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind, such as a joint venture . . I would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a contention that he was bound by an obligation of confidence.’
‘First, the information must be of a confidential nature. As Lord Greene said in the Saltman case . . ‘something which is public property and public knowledge’ cannot per se provide any foundation for proceedings for breach of confidence. However confidential the circumstances of communication, there can be no breach of confidence in revealing to others something which is already common knowledge. But this must not be taken too far. Something that has been constructed solely from materials in the public domain may possess the necessary quality of confidentiality: for something new and confidential may have been brought into being by the application of the skill and ingenuity of the human brain . . Novelty depends on the thing itself, and not upon the quality of its constituent parts . . whether it is described as originality or novelty or ingenuity or otherwise, I think there must be some product of the human brain which suffices to confer a confidential nature upon the information.
The second requirement is that the information must have been communicated in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. However secret and confidential the information, there can be no binding obligation of confidence if that information is blurted out in public or is communicated in other circumstances which negative any duty of holding it confidential. From the authorities cited to me, I have not been able to derive any very precise idea of what test is to be applied in determining whether the circumstances import an obligation of confidence. In the Argyll case . . Ungoed-Thomas, J. concluded his discussion of the circumstances in which the publication of marital communications should be restrained as being confidential by saying ‘If this was a well-developed jurisdiction doubtless there would be guides and tests to aid in exercising it’. In the absence of such guides or tests he then in effect concluded that part of the communications there in question would on any reasonable test emerge as confidential. It may be that that hard-worked creature, the reasonable man, may be pressed into service once more; for I do not see why he should not labour in equity as well as at law. It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation of confidence. In particular, where information of commercial or industrial value is given on a business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind, such as a joint venture or the manufacture of articles by one party for the other, I would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a contention that he was bound by an obligation of confidence: see the Saltman case . . On that footing, for reasons that will appear, I do not think I need explore this head further. I merely add that I doubt whether equity would intervene unless the circumstances are of sufficient gravity; equity ought not to be invoked merely to protect trivial tittle-tattle, however confidential.
Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of the person communicating it. Some of the statements of principle in the cases omit any mention of detriment; others include it. At first sight, it seems that detriment ought to be present if equity is to be induced to intervene; but I can conceive of cases where a plaintiff might have substantial motives for seeking the aid of equity and yet suffer nothing which could fairly be called detriment to him, as when the confidential information shows him in a favourable light but gravely injures some relation or friend of his whom he wishes to protect. The point does not arise for decision in this case, for detriment to the plaintiff plainly exists. I need therefore say no more than that although for the purposes of this case I have stated the proposition in the stricter form, I wish to keep open the possibility of the true proposition being that in the wider form.’
Megarry J said: ‘if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose on him the equitable obligation of confidence.’

[Diddly Shyte]

Whatagwaan inna here? Ya scared mi lawyers gonna get ya?

[ShaneMosleySr]

Did anyone get arrested or sued when the Executive Intelligence Review published a classified list of MI6 agents in 1999?

Lol, no.

Thomas Hauser is expected to be held responsible for publishing an accurate report of a failed drug test but a British Magazine wasn’t punished at all for publishing classified information LMFAO.

You wanna know why? Because that magazine has no relation to MI6 or the government. They’re not bound to keep information classified. It’s not their responsibility. A source gave them the list and they published it.

Thomas Hauser has no relation to UKAD. He didn’t sign an NDA with UKAD. He doesn’t have to keep quiet about things they want kept confidential.

The level of brain dead people on this site is amazing.

[PotentialToast]

That case is an engineer suing an engineer. It has nothing to do with a media report.

No, it sets a legal precedent, the principles of which have been used in thousands of cases since. The law of confidentiality does not come from Statute.