Without the history of advancement through traditional means, underpriviledged youth believe what they see and hear. Newspaper stories and word of mouth tales about the lucrative sums allegedly earned by boxing champions have often obscured reality. For example, in 1932 New York boxing clubs dispensed nearly 1.5 million dollars to prize fighters, but considering there were some 945 licensed boxers, the average income was only $1500- a sum not far from the poverty level. Worse yet, the average income in no way reflected the fiscal sgortfall for the average boxer: 100 main event boxers shared $1,000,000 while the rest were left with $500,000 to divide among themselves; their average yearly earnings totaled less than $600.
Looking at success in terms of advancement to the top also sheds critical light on the likelihood of that success. In a localized vertical mobility study of 127 boxers from 1938 to 1951, sociologists Weinberg and Arond found that very few boxers reached the top of their profession: 107(84.2%) progressed no further than the local preliminary or semi main category: 11 boxers (8.7%) became local main-event fighters; 8 (7.1%) achieved national recognition as top contenders; and just 1 fighter became champion. A financial study conducted on a NATIONAL SCALE during the same period found that only 600 professional boxers earned enough money to sustain themselves and only 60 became head line fighters.
Time has had little impact upon these statistics. The experience of undercard boxer Malik Dozier of Washington D.C., is representative of false hopes, misperceptions, and the shattered dreams. According to Dozier, "If you got a name like Sugar Ray Leonard, boxings great, but not if your at rock bottom like me." He was looking from the bottom up, having fought preliminary bouts on the same card as the former Olympic champion's early professional fights. To Dozier, Leonard's $30,000 purse appeared astronomical in comparison to the $150 he recieved (before expenses); indeed, on one occasion his pay was not sufficient to cover medical costs for a broken jaw and teeth. Like many other boxers, Dozier had to supplement his income with money from a nine-to-five job. Fighters would often drive 100 to 400 miles for a $75 or $150 fight, sleeping in their cars to cut expenses. One boxer aptly remarked, "Aint no dues like boxing dues."
Beyond the ring, Jeffrey T. Sammons, 1990
Looking at success in terms of advancement to the top also sheds critical light on the likelihood of that success. In a localized vertical mobility study of 127 boxers from 1938 to 1951, sociologists Weinberg and Arond found that very few boxers reached the top of their profession: 107(84.2%) progressed no further than the local preliminary or semi main category: 11 boxers (8.7%) became local main-event fighters; 8 (7.1%) achieved national recognition as top contenders; and just 1 fighter became champion. A financial study conducted on a NATIONAL SCALE during the same period found that only 600 professional boxers earned enough money to sustain themselves and only 60 became head line fighters.
Time has had little impact upon these statistics. The experience of undercard boxer Malik Dozier of Washington D.C., is representative of false hopes, misperceptions, and the shattered dreams. According to Dozier, "If you got a name like Sugar Ray Leonard, boxings great, but not if your at rock bottom like me." He was looking from the bottom up, having fought preliminary bouts on the same card as the former Olympic champion's early professional fights. To Dozier, Leonard's $30,000 purse appeared astronomical in comparison to the $150 he recieved (before expenses); indeed, on one occasion his pay was not sufficient to cover medical costs for a broken jaw and teeth. Like many other boxers, Dozier had to supplement his income with money from a nine-to-five job. Fighters would often drive 100 to 400 miles for a $75 or $150 fight, sleeping in their cars to cut expenses. One boxer aptly remarked, "Aint no dues like boxing dues."
Beyond the ring, Jeffrey T. Sammons, 1990